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Home-Ownership as a Social Norm and Positional Good: 
Subjective Well-Being Evidence from Panel Data 
 
 
I. Abstract: Much attention has been devoted to examining the absolute benefits 
of home-ownership (e.g. security and autonomy). This paper by contrast is 
concerned with conceptualising and testing the relative benefits of home-
ownership; those benefits that depend on an individual’s status in society.  
Home-ownership has previously been analysed as a social norm, implying that 
the relative benefits (costs) associated with being an owner (renter) are 
positively related to relevant others’ home-ownership values. The theoretical 
contribution of this paper is to additionally conceptualise home-ownership as a 
positional good, implying that the status of both home-owners and renters is 
negatively related to relevant others’ home-ownership consumption.  
The empirical contribution of this paper is to quantitatively test for these relative 
benefits in terms of subjective well-being. We run fixed effects regressions on 
three waves of the British Household Panel Study. We find that i) a strengthening 
of relevant others’ home-ownership values is associated with increases 
(decreases) in the subjective well-being of home-owners (renters), and ii) an 
increase in relevant others’ home-ownership consumption decreases the life 
satisfaction of owners but has no effect for renters.  
Overall our findings suggest that i) the relative benefit of home-ownership are 
both statistically significant and of a meaningful magnitude, and ii) home-
ownership is likely to be both a social norm and a positional good. Without 
explicitly recognising these relative benefits, policymakers risk overestimating 
the contribution of home-ownership to societal well-being. 
Keywords: Home-ownership , Social norm , Positional good , Subjective well-being , Housing 
tenure  
 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
When compared to renting, home-ownership is associated with positive outcomes at the individual 
level. There is quantitative evidence that home-owners have higher life satisfaction (e.g. Zumbro, 
2014), mental health (Manturuk, 2012), and ontological security (e.g. Saunders, 1990); and that 
children of home-owning parents do better at school (e.g. Haurin et al, 2002; Green and White 
(1997).
1
  
The literature typically attributes this tenure gap to three absolute benefits of home-ownership 
(Zumbro, 2014). First, people have a natural possessive instinct and a desire to mark out their own 
territory which home-ownership fulfils (e.g. Saunders, 1990; Lindblad and Quercia, 2015). Second, 
home-ownership improves living conditions because home-owners have a greater financial stake in 
their home than renters (Galster, 1983). Third, homeownership can offer greater security, as home-
                                                            
1
 See Dietz and Haurin (2003) for (economics focussed) review on social benefits of home-ownership.  
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owners cannot be involuntarily moved from their home by a landlord. Some sociologists (e.g. 
Saunders, 1990) contend that this preserves the ‘ontological security’ of home-owners. 
These absolute benefits have arguably influenced governments to make expanding rates of home-
ownership a key policy goal. For example, a press release from the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (2000) cited the tenure gap in educational outcomes as justification for policies 
supporting home-ownership (Harkness and Newman, 2003). Similarly, in the UK, where this paper is 
based, policy documents have invoked the absolute benefits in justifying policies to expand home-
ownership rates (see Gurney, 1999) which currently sit at 65 percent (English Housing Survey, 2015) 
In this paper, we contend that the tenure gap may actually be attributable, at least in part, to the 
relative benefits of home-ownership. The study of the relative benefits of consumption has emerged 
as a key area of research across the social sciences.
2
 The idea that relative income and relative 
consumption matters is not new. For example, Adam Smith (1776) recognised that there were certain 
‘necessities’ without which an individual would feel shame. Given that housing is the largest form of 
consumption, it is striking that so little attention has been devoted to examining the importance of 
relative housing conditions. To facilitate a thorough theoretical and empirical study, we limit our 
scope to the relative benefits of housing tenure in terms of subjective well-being.  
We test for two types of relative benefits. First, we follow previous authors in conceptualising home-
ownership as a social norm: home-owners benefit from being considered ‘normal’ by society, versus 
renters who are considered ‘abnormal’3. We hypothesise that if home-ownership is a social norm, then 
the magnitude of the relative benefits of home-ownership should be positively related to the home-
ownership values of relevant others: the stronger the social norm of home-ownership among one’s 
friends and family, the higher subjective well-being home-owners will have, and the lower subjective 
well-being renters will have.   
To our knowledge, we are the first to additionally conceptualise home-ownership as a positional 
good.  Home-owners not only benefit from being ‘normal’, but also through being considered to have 
higher relative wealth, and in turn, higher status than renters. If home-ownership is a positional good, 
then we hypothesise that the subjective well-being of owners (and renters) should be negatively 
related to the home-ownership rates of relevant others. When home-ownership is expanded, this 
reduces the wealth that home-ownership (and renting) signals, thereby decreasing the status and 
subjective well-being of the original home-owner (or renter).   
The crucial point about relative benefits-as opposed to absolute benefits- is that they necessarily come 
attached with relative costs. By conforming to the social norm, home-buyers benefit from being 
‘normal’, but it comes at the expense of renters who are increasingly ‘abnormal’. By signalling their 
wealth, home-buyers benefit from increased status, but because status is an inherently relative 
concept, this comes at the expense of others whose status necessarily decreases. Therefore, if the 
tenure gap in outcomes is due to the relative benefits of home-ownership then expanding rates of 
home-ownership will have a much weaker overall effect on societal well-being, than if they were due 
to the absolute benefits. Understanding whether the tenure gap in outcomes is primarily attributable to 
the absolute or the relative benefits is vital because the policy implications of the two logics are very 
different.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we conceptualise home-ownership as a social norm, and 
develop our first hypothesis. Next, we additionally conceptualise home-ownership as a positional 
                                                            
2
 For example, Easterlin (1974) is one of the most cited paper in modern economics (4154 citations) and The 
Spirit Level by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) was recently estimated to have sold 300,000 copies 
(http://inequality.org/spirit-level-level/ accessed on 16/12/2015). 
3
 Note, the authors do not consider renters as abnormal, and owners as normal. Rather, we argue that this is 
how British society perceives renters/owners 
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good, and form hypothesis two. We then outline the data and methodology before presenting and 
discussing our results. We conclude with policy implications and an agenda for future research into 
the relative benefits of home-ownership and housing more generally.  
 
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Home-Ownership as a Social Norm 
Of the three papers that have formally conceptualised and tested the relative benefits of home-
ownership, all have adopted a social norm framework (Gurney, 1999; Cohen et al, 2009; Knight, 
2002). There is no standard definition of a ‘social norm’ but definitions tend to imply three distinct 
elements (Hechter and Opp, 2001): they should be behavioural regularities; there should be a sense of 
‘oughtness’ with them; and there should be sanctions associated with conforming or deviating. 
Sanctions can be rewards or punishments. Significantly, according to the economic model of Akerlof 
(1980), the strength of the sanctions associated with conforming/not conforming will be in proportion 
to the strength of ‘oughtness’ among one’s ‘relevant others’. In this paper, we define ‘relevant others’ 
as those persons an individual interacts with, seeks the respect of, or compares themselves to. 
Generally, these will encompass an individual’s friends, family, work colleagues and neighbours. 
Homans (1974, p.150) recognises the influential role this group plays in enforcing social norms: “If a 
group can offer much in the way of friendships to its members, it can exert much control over them, 
since it can deprive them of much if they don’t conform”.  
So is home-ownership a social norm in the UK? It is certainly a behavioural regularity. Despite recent 
declines, in 2013-14, 65 percent of households owned their own homes (English Housing Survey, 
2015). Furthermore, there is a sense of oughtness to do with home-ownership. Becoming a home-
owner has been variously described as a ‘rite of passage’ (Dupuis and Thorns, 1998) and a ‘badge of 
citizenship’ (Murie 1998). Gurney (1999) examined the language used in landmark housing policy 
documents, and among homeowners in Bristol, to identify three discrete discourses which normalise 
home-ownership. First, the dwellings of home-owners are imbued with the warmth and security of 
`home’ whilst renters’ dwellings are described in more spartan terms. Second, home ownership is 
associated with a set of values that constitute a ‘good citizen’. Third, homeownership is viewed as 
meeting a deep and natural desire for independent control of one’s living environment. This third 
discourse is likely to be age dependent (Knight, 2002). For students and unmarried young adults, 
renting is likely to be considered ‘normal’ but past a certain point– Knight suggests the age of 30- 
renting privately becomes a deviation from schedule and ‘abnormal’. All three discourses work 
together to cast home-ownership as ‘normal’ and renting as ‘abnormal’. The norm against social 
rental is likely to be stronger still. Not only are social renters on the wrong side of Gurney’s three 
discourses, but they are also perceived as being dependent on the state (e.g. Robinson, 2013).  
 
The strength of the sanctions associated with (not) conforming will depend on the strength or 
‘oughtness’ of the social norm among relevant others. To illustrate, take 1950’s Britain. There were 
social norms against both homosexuality and holding your knife and fork in the wrong hand but the 
strength of the social norm-and the sanctions involved – were much greater in the case of the former 
than the latter. Similarly, the norm in favour of home-ownership – and the sanctions associated with 
renting or owning- will vary in strength between different groups of relevant others. Consistent with 
this logic, Cohen et. al (2009) conducted a longitudinal study of 919 low-moderate income renters in 
the USA, and found the home-ownership values of ‘important others’ to be associated with stronger 
homeownership intentions. Respondents were more likely to intend to buy a home if they thought 
‘important others’ were of the opinion that the respondent should buy a home. Furthermore, stronger 
home-ownership intentions were associated with a higher likelihood of becoming a home-owner in 
the future.  
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Sanctions can be rewards or punishments, and can be imposed directly or indirectly. If a renter’s 
relevant others regularly discuss the merits of home-ownership or the disadvantages of renting then 
the renter may internalise this discourse, and feel a sense of shame for being ‘abnormal’. Inversely, an 
owner may feel a sense of pride and confidence (see Gurney, 1999). These are referred to as internal 
sanctions.  Relevant others could also affect an individual’s subjective well-being directly through 
granting admiration or deference to owners, or through withholding respect from renters. These are 
defined as external sanctions. Sanctions could also be more material. A person of high rank can 
expect to be treated favourably by other individuals with whom he might engage in social and 
economic interactions (Hirsh, 2005; Frank, 2007). 
 
For all the sanctions above to exist, an individual’s housing tenure must be known by their relevant 
others. This may seem unlikely given housing tenure is intangible. However, the status that parents’ 
derive from their children’s level of education (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998) indicates that 
something need not be tangible to carry relative benefits, it just needs to be known by others. Our 
contention is that if someone undergoes a tenure transition, then considering the social significance of 
the life event, this information is likely to be dispersed among their relevant others. 
 
Because of the accompanying sanctions, ‘being normal’, and social status more generally, is 
important for a number of outcomes including adult health (see Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006 for a 
review), educational outcomes (e.g. Hoff and Pandey, 2004) and, most relevantly, subjective well-
being (e.g. Clark, 2003). The social norm literature therefore predicts that an individual’s housing 
tenure indicates, in part, whether they are ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’. The extent of the relative benefits 
(or costs) associated with being a home-owner (or renter) depend on the strength of the home-
ownership values of relevant others. Thus, we have our first hypothesis: if home-ownership is a social 
norm, the home-ownership values of relevant others will be positively related to the subjective well-
being of owners, but negatively related to the subjective well-being of renters.  
 
But what about the home-ownership rates of relevant others? If more of one’s relevant others are 
homeowners, does this impact the status of owners and renters?  
 
Home-Ownership as a Positional Good 
Veblen’s (1899) theory of conspicuous consumption, Duesenberry’s (1949) relative income theory 
and Hirsh’s (1976) theory of positional goods all make the point that utility depends on relative, as 
well as absolute, consumption. Relative consumption matters because it signals the consumer’s 
relative wealth. Relative wealth, in turn, matters because it indicates one’s power over others 
(Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981) and, in many cases, one’s natural ability (Frank, 
2007). It is therefore a key determinant of social status.  
Being able to purchase one’s own home requires a greater level of wealth than renting in the private 
sector, which in turn requires a greater level of wealth than renting social housing. Thus becoming a 
home-owner signals an increase in relative wealth, 
The average home owner is higher status, better paid, better educated, richer and more middle 
class… consequently the change from tenant to home owner increases the likelihood that the 
individual will be taken to be well paid, well educated and middle class. (Marcuse, 1975 p. 195)  
 
However, as the proportion of the population who can access home-ownership increases, the relative 
wealth that home-ownership signals will decrease (Forrest and Murie, 1983). By the same logic, 
expansion of home-ownership will also decrease the relative wealth with which renting is associated. 
This process has been most noticeable in the social housing sector. Between 1981 and 2011, the size 
of the social rental sector decreased from 31% to 18% as skilled workers moved to home-ownership 
(Jones and Murie, 2006). Whereas council tenants in England in the 1950s and into the 1960s were 
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considered by society to be relatively affluent, now the perception is of an economically inactive 
underclass (Watt, 2008). 
The same logic also applies to private renting. Those who move from private renting to home-
ownership need capital. This means that while relative to other owners, they are likely to be poor; 
compared to other renters, they are likely to be wealthy. By leaving the private rental sector, they will 
lower the relative status of those left behind. In the Spanish context, Vera-Toscana and Ateca-
Amestoy (2008) found that renting in a predominantly home-owners’ neighbourhood had a significant 
negative effect on housing satisfaction “It does not seem to be the fact of being an owner vs. non-
owner what causes satisfaction or dissatisfaction” they noted “but the fact of being the renter 
surrounded by home-owners”.  
 
We therefore propose that home-ownership is a positional good, which Frank (1985) defines as a 
good “whose value depends relatively strongly on how they compare with things owned by others.” 
Becoming a home-owner will increase an individual’s status as it signals an increase in their relative 
wealth, but the price will be paid by everyone else whose status necessarily declines. We thus have 
our second hypothesis: if home-ownership is a positional good, then home-ownership rates among 
relevant others will be negatively related to the subjective well-being of both home-owners and 
renters.  
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this paper, we test both hypotheses using a quantitative methodology. We recognise this approach 
has limitations. Notably, we cannot explore what form sanctions take, nor who imposes them. 
However, we can more confidently test the causal relationships hypothesised above, and quantify their 
strength. 
 
Data is drawn from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). Between 1991 and 2008, the BHPS 
conducted annual interviews on a nationally representative sample of the same 5500 private 
households, expanding to 9000 households by 2008. The BHPS includes a wide range of demographic 
variables. Our analysis is limited to the three waves which included information on the importance 
attached to home-ownership; 1998, 2003 and 2008.  
 
Our econometric analysis is based on the following specification:  
 
 = ( +	
 +	 +	) (1) 
 
According to expression (1), for each individual i, subjective well-being at time t is labelled by  , 
and is considered to be a function of relevant others’ home-ownership values, V; relevant others’ 
home-ownership rates or consumption, C; and a range of socio-demographic control variables, X. We 
adopt a fixed-effects regression analysis, which means that for each individual i, we estimate the 
effect of changes in the independent variables, from one wave to the next, on changes in the 
dependent variable. In doing so, a fixed-effects regression controls for all time invariant and 
individual-specific unobservables αi, for example, baseline wealth, or how one understands the life 
satisfaction scale.  
 
In the past decade, subjective well-being indicators have gained legitimacy among researchers and 
policymakers. Subjective well-being has both an evaluative (cognitive/judgemental) component, and 
an experiential (emotional/affective) component, which when assessed together, are at least 
moderately correlated (Pavot and Diener, 1993). To proxy for the evaluative component of subjective 
well-being, we use responses to the question “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life 
overall?” on a scale of 1-7. There is a large literature pointing to the validity of life satisfaction 
measures. See Diener et al (2013) for a review. The experiential component of subjective well-being 
is proxied for using the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ). The GHQ-12 reflects overall mental 
well-being. It is constructed from the responses to twelve questions (administered via a self-
Page 5 of 29
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
completion questionnaire) covering feelings of strain, depression, happiness, inability to cope, 
anxiety-based insomnia, and lack of confidence, amongst others. Responses are made on a four-point 
scale of frequency of a feeling in relation to a person's usual state: "Not at all", "No more than usual", 
"Rather more than usual", and "Much more than usual". The GHQ is widely used in medical, 
psychological and sociological research, and is considered to be a robust indicator of the individual’s 
psychological state.  This paper uses the Caseness GHQ score, which counts the number of questions 
for which the response is in one of the two "low well-being" categories. This count is then reversed so 
that higher scores indicate higher levels of subjective well-being, running from 0 (all twelve responses 
are “low subjective well-being”) to 12 (no responses are “low subjective well-being”), after which the 
majority of respondents record a score of 12. In the absence of any literature to suggest otherwise, we 
assume both the evaluative and experiential components to move together in our analysis.  
  
Note that both our hypotheses are concerned with the effect of relevant others’ home-ownership 
values/rates on those people who have stayed in the same tenure over time (as opposed to those 
people who have changed tenure). To this end, all regressions are run separately for the two groups; i) 
renters and ii) owners. We then split the renters sample into private and social renters in order to 
empirically distinguish between the sanctions associated with the two tenures. Throughout the 
analysis, we define those adults (>20 years old) who live in the same household as home-owning 
parents as renters, contrary to the BHPS which defines them as owners. Observations which relate to 
individuals aged under 21 are excluded from our analysis.  
 
One key step in our methodology is to define relevant others. Relevant others, or ‘reference groups’ 
have been variously defined as people in the same country (e.g. Easterlin, 1974); region (e.g. Clark, 
2003); and of a similar age (McBride, 2001). Others have used multiple criteria, such as Van de Stadt 
et al (1985) who define the reference group as people of a similar education level, age, and 
employment status. We follow Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) in identifying this group as those people 
with similar education (higher education, medium education or low education), inside the same age 
bracket (21-30; 31-40; 41-50; 51-65; 65+), and living in the same region (North UK4 or South UK). 
We use these criteria for several reasons5.  
We use the same BHPS data to quantify the attributes of relevant others. When we split the full 
sample of individuals according to the above criteria, we obtain thirty groups of relevant others, 
varying in size from 64 to 1012. Thus in each of the three waves, every individual in the sample is 
both an individual in their own right (i.e. we are interested in what affects their subjective well-being) 
and part of one group of ‘relevant others’ (i.e. according to our hypotheses, they affect other people’s 
subjective well-being).  By growing older, becoming educated, or relocating, an individual can change 
their relevant others from one wave to the next.   
 
In each one of the three waves, individuals were asked to rate how important it was to own their own 
home on a scale of 1-10.  This question is reproduced below, as it appeared to the interviewer (figure 
1).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
                                                            
4 North UK includes North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. South UK 
includes London, South East, South West, East Midlands, and West Midlands. I also dropped the ‘region’ criterion (i.e. 
defined relevant others as people of similar education and age, in the UK as a whole) but this made little meaningful 
difference to the coefficients of interest (see appendix 1 for results).  
5
 First, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) found the income of this group to be as important as own income for an individual’s 
subjective well-being, implying that the material success of an individual is defined (by others/themselves) relative to this 
group. Second, these criteria are likely to incorporate a significant proportion of one’s work colleagues, friends, and siblings 
– all of whom are in a strong position to impose sanctions. Third, including age as a criterion fits well with Knight (2002), 
who found that society compares renters to people of a similar age in determining whether they were ‘normal’/’abnormal’.   
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For each individual i, we use mean responses to this question among relevant others (excluding the 
response of the individual themselves) as a proxy for the strength or ‘oughtness’ of home-ownership 
values of relevant others,  . Scores for this variable ranged from 7.06 (for 21-30 year olds with low 
education in the North of England in 2008) to 8.94 (65+ year olds with medium education in the 
South of England in 2008). Similarly, we use the home-ownership rates among relevant others as an 
indicator of the consumption of relevant others, C, with scores ranging from 18 percent to 93 percent. 
Note that the reference group is assumed to be exogenous, which is standard in empirical work 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).  
 
We control for changes in age, marital status, employment status, individual household income, 
housing costs (mortgage/rent), housing problems which have been found to influence subjective well-
being (damp and noise), year, region, year*region interaction terms (which control for changes in 
house prices/rents at the regional level) along with other variables listed in appendix 2. Importantly, 
we also control for the mean household income of relevant others, in order to ensure that the effect of 
changes in relevant others’ home-ownership values and consumption are independent of changes in 
relevant others’ income6.   
 
The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v4.0 (Oct 2012) for 
Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The PanelWhiz 
generated DO file to retrieve the BHPS data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon 
request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own. Haisken-DeNew and Hahn 
(2010) describe PanelWhiz in detail.  
 
V. RESULTS 
Relevant others’ home-ownership rates (or consumption) 
We first describe the effect of relevant others’ home-ownership rates on the subjective well-being of 
owners and renters. The coefficients are reported in the second row of table 1. Consistent with the 
positional good hypothesis (hypothesis one), we find that for home-owners, changes in home-
ownership rates among relevant others are negatively related to changes in life satisfaction (p<0.05). 
The magnitude of this effect is substantial: an increase in relevant others’ home-ownership rates from 
the 25th percentile (56 percent) to the 75th percentile (85 percent) of the sample, would lead, on 
average, to a decrease in owners’ life satisfaction of -.0.11.  To put this effect into context, Zumbro 
(2014) found becoming a home-owner with a low financial burden (in Germany) led to an increase in 
life satisfaction of only 0.09 (and this was on a 10 point scale!). As another benchmark, Fujiwara 
(2013) found that when respondents in BHPS began reporting damp and neighbour noise, each was 
associated with a -0.05 decrease in life satisfaction, and these were the two most damaging housing 
problems. The coefficient on relevant others’ consumption is also negative when GHQ caseness is 
used as a dependent variable, but the relationship is not statistically significant. For renters, we find 
no negative impact of relevant others’ home-ownership rates on individual subjective well-being
7
. 
This holds even when we split renters into social renters and private renters – see appendix 4. 
Together, these findings imply that home-ownership is a positional good, but only for owners. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE   
Relevant others’ home-ownership values 
                                                            
6
 We also included relevant others’ average house size (‘rooms per person’) as a control variable, but this made no 
meaningful difference to the coefficient of interest (see appendix 3 for results) 
7
 This absence could be due to the small sample size- the sample size for renters is about 40 percent smaller in terms of 
observations- but this seems unlikely considering, i) the opposing coefficient signs on GHQ caseness and life satisfaction, 
and ii) the small magnitude of both coefficients. 
Page 7 of 29
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Our results also imply that home-ownership is a social norm. The coefficients on the third row of 
table 1 show that, for owners, changes in the home-ownership values of relevant others are positively 
related to changes in subjective well-being, both in terms of life satisfaction (p<0.01) and GHQ 
caseness (p<0.05). The magnitude of these effects are also meaningful. If the importance of home-
ownership to a home-owner’s relevant others increased from the 25
th
 percentile (7.68) to the 75
th
 
percentile (8.08), this would lead to an increase in the home-owner’s life satisfaction of 0.06 and an 
increase in GHQ caseness of 0.15.  
For renters, the negative effects of relevant others’ home-ownership values on subjective well-being 
are also statistically significant and substantial. If the importance of home-ownership to a renter’s 
relevant others increased from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile, this would lead to a decrease 
in the renter’s life satisfaction of -0.12 (p<0.05) and a decrease in GHQ caseness of -0.18 (p<0.1)
8
 
Together, these results imply that the relative benefits associated with home-ownership as a social 
norm are distributed on a zero sum basis: a strengthening of home-ownership values increases the 
subjective well-being of 64 percent of respondents (owners) and decreases the subjective well-being 
of 36 percent of respondents (renters), but the magnitude of the decrease is approximately double the 
magnitude of the increase.
9
 
When we split the renter sample into social and private renters (see appendix 4), the coefficients on 
relevant others’ values remain negative for both private and social renters, but are only statistically 
significant for social renters: an increase in the home-ownership values of relevant others has a 
negative effect on the mental health and life satisfaction of social renters. If the importance of home-
ownership to a social renter’s relevant others increased from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile, 
this would lead to a decrease in their life satisfaction of -.12 (p<0.1), and a decrease in their GHQ 
Caseness of -0.4 (p<0.05). To put this latter effect into context, the effect on becoming unemployed 
on male GHQ caseness is -0.85 (Clark and Georgellis, 2012).  
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We also conducted two additional regressions to test further whether home-ownership is a social 
norm. First we examined whether the effect of becoming a home-owner was moderated by changes in 
the home-ownership values of relevant others. If, in the period that I move from renting to owning, 
home-ownership becomes more important to my relevant others, then according to the social norm 
hypothesis, this should increase the magnitude of any positive home-ownership effect on my 
subjective well-being. To test this hypothesis, we used the same specification (equation 1) but 
included two additional variables; i) a dummy variable indicating whether the individual was owner 
(=1) or renter (=0) and, ii) this dummy variable interacted with relevant others’ home-ownership 
values (). We included both owners and renters in the sample, to identify those individuals who 
moved in between tenures. This model is very similar to that adopted Clark (2003) in testing for 
unemployment as a social norm. As can be seen in the figures below (full regression results are shown 
in appendix 5) the effect of becoming a home-owner on subjective well-being increases as the home- 
ownership values of one’s cohort strengthen.  For instance, if everybody’s cohort attached a high 
importance to home-ownership (i.e. 75
th
 percentile of 8.08), then becoming a home-owner would lead, 
on average, to a small increase in subjective well-being (+0.05 life satisfaction; +0.03 GHQ 
Caseness).  But if everyone’s cohort attached low importance to home-ownership (i,e 25
th
 percentile 
of 7.68), then becoming a home-owner would, on average, lead to a small decrease in subjective well-
being (-0.07 life satisfaction;-0.3 GHQ Caseness). It should be noted though, that by looking at people 
who have changed tenure, we heighten the risk of confounding variables. For instance, among groups 
                                                            
8 We interpret this as statistically significant because theory only predicts this negative effect thus justifying a one sided t-
test, for which the standard threshold p-value is 0.1. 
9 In terms of life satisfaction, the positive effect of relevant others’ values on home-owners is 2.1 times the size of the 
negative effect on renters. In terms of GHQ caseness, this multiple is 1.9.  
Page 8 of 29
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
of relevant others with stronger home-ownership values, the gap in neighbourhood/housing quality 
between the home-ownership sector and the private rental sector may be larger, and this may explain 
why the home-ownership effect on subjective well-being is larger among these groups. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
If home-ownership is a social norm, then we would also expect increases in the importance that 
relevant others attach to home-ownership to be associated with increases in the importance that the 
individual (renter or owner) attaches to home-ownership. We conducted an additional regression 
using the same specification (1) but replacing subjective well-being W with the individual’s home-
ownership values, on the same scale of 1-10. Using the full sample (owners and renters together), we 
find changes in the home-ownership values of relevant others to be positively related (p<0.05) to 
changes in the home-ownership values of the individual (see table 2, below) which again implies that 
home-ownership is a social norm. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
One potential concern is that the home-ownership social norm is correlated with other social norms 
which may have opposite effects on the subjective well-being of owners and renters
10
. It could be, for 
instance, that home-ownership values are correlated with levels of racism. If there were more ethnic 
minorities renting than owning, then this may explain why the subjective well-being of home-owners 
(renters) are positively (negatively) related to the home-ownership values of relevant others.  This 
would not, however, explain the findings presented in figure 2 (or appendix 5), which show that the 
increase in subjective well-being associated with becoming a home-owner depends on the home-
ownership values of relevant others, keeping income, education, household structure and all time-
invariant variables (e.g. race/ethnicity/family background) constant. As noted, this regression is not 
perfectly robust. Therefore, there is still a possibility that these other norms are confounding variables.  
Moving house is also a potential source of omitted variable bias. For instance, a strengthening of 
relevant others’ values may be associated with home-owners moving to a better neighbourhood, thus 
improving their subjective well-being. To test for this, we excluded those respondents who moved 
house between waves. That is, we only looked at the effect of changes in relevant others’ home-
ownership values and consumption on changes in the subjective well-being of those respondents who 
stayed in the same house from one wave to the next. For owners, the results fit even more closely with 
our hypotheses (see appendix 6); all four coefficients of interest are statistically significant with the 
expected signs. On the other hand, for renters, none of the four coefficients of interest are statistically 
significant, although the coefficients on relevant others’ values remain negative.  
One potential concern raised by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) is multi-collinearity. The three variables 
used to construct the relevant others (age, education, and region) are also included in regressions as 
variables in their own right. This could lead to multi-collinearity. To test for this, we conducted the 
regressions in table 1, but this time without age, education, region and region*year variables. This 
leads to similar conclusions as the ones presented in Table 1 (see appendix 7) and indicates that multi-
collinearity is not a problem.   
 
Some may object to our treatment of life satisfaction and GHQ caseness as cardinal. With regard to 
life satisfaction, this concern has been addressed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), who have 
shown that ordinal and cardinal approaches usually lead to qualitatively very similar results.  With 
regard to GHQ Caseness, the concern is more pertinent. Therefore, we ran regressions without 
assuming cardinality in GHQ Caseness. More specifically, we collapsed GHQ Caseness into two 
values; 0 (for GHQ Caseness values 1-11) and 1 (for GHQ Caseness value 12), and ran several non-
linear regressions, consisting of; i) two pooled logit models for renters and owners, and ii) two fixed 
                                                            
10
 Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this point.   
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effect logit models for owners and renters. All logit regressions used a similar specification to table 
111. With regard to the pooled logit model (appendix 8, columns 1 and 2), relevant others’ home-
ownership values are positively related to the (binary) GHQ Caseness of home-owners (p<0.05). 
None of the other relevant coefficients are statistically significant. For a respondent to be included in 
the fixed effect logit regressions, their GHQ Caseness score must have changed over time from 1-11 to 
12, or the reverse. Setting this criterion reduces the sample size of owners by approximately 75 
percent, and of renters by almost 90 percent. It is perhaps unsurprising therefore, that none of the 
relevant coefficients are statistically significant (see appendix 8, columns 3 and 4), although the effect 
of relevant others’ home-ownership values on the (binary) GHQ Caseness of owners is nearly 
statistically significant (p=.13).  
Finally, some maybe concerned that those absolute benefits of home-ownership which are not 
controlled for in  	(security and autonomy, in particular), maybe driving the effects on subjective 
well-being that we attribute to the relative benefits. We cannot discount this possibility. However, for 
this to happen, these absolute benefits would need to meet two criteria. First, they would need to vary 
over time within an individual who stays in the same tenure. Second, and most notably, this variance 
over time would need to be correlated with the variance in relevant others’ home-ownership 
rates/values. If, for example, changes in autonomy or security were driving the ‘social norm effect’ 
that we observe, then increases in relevant others’ home-ownership values would need to be 
negatively related to renters’ autonomy/security, but positively related to owners’ autonomy/security 
(and both associations would need to be independent of changes in stigma, shame, pride, or any other 
‘relative benefit’). It seems unlikely that the absolute benefits of home-ownership would meet this 
second criterion. Or to put it another way, it seems likely that the relative benefits of homeownership 
explain subjective well-being over and above the absolute benefits of homeownership. Nevertheless, it 
is undoubtedly a limitation of this paper that we do not directly control for all of the absolute benefits 
of home-ownership, and one which future research should address, if possible.  
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we conceptualised home-ownership as both a positional good and a social norm. Based 
on this original conceptual framework, we proposed that the status of owners and renters should 
depend on both the home-ownership rates and values of relevant others.  
 
Hypothesis one drew from social norm theory and predicted that if sanctions are dealt out on a binary 
basis of whether the individual is ‘normal’ (owner) or ‘abnormal’ (renter), then the strength of these 
sanctions should depend on the strength of the norm among relevant others. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, we found that if relevant others attach greater importance to home-ownership, this 
increases the subjective well-being of home-owners and decreases the subjective well-being of 
renters.  
 
Conceptualising home-ownership as a social norm, however, does not fully capture the nature of the 
relative benefits of home-ownership. Hypothesis two drew on the positional goods theory to contend 
that sanctions are also dealt out by relevant others according to status. One determinant of status is 
relative wealth. By becoming a home-owner, one can signal that they are worth a certain amount. 
When home-ownership is expanded, this reduces the wealth that home-ownership signals, thereby 
decreasing the status and subjective well-being of the original home-owner. Consistent with this logic, 
we found that as home-ownership rates among relevant others increased, the life satisfaction of home-
owners decreased.  
 
                                                            
11
The only difference was, for the fixed effect logit models, instead of the twelve regional dummy variables, we used two 
dummy variables; North UK and South UK. This change was needed for the model to converge.  
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Hypothesis two also predicted that as more of a renter’s relevant others become home-owners, 
remaining a renter would signal a greater level of relative deprivation. We found no evidence to 
support this logic. Our results therefore imply that home-ownership is a social norm for both owners 
and renters, but is only a positional good for owners. We considered two possible explanations for this 
discrepancy. First, owners and their relevant others may be more materialistic than renters and their 
relevant others, meaning relative wealth matters more to the status of owners than renters. We 
compared the importance that owners and renters attach to ‘having a lot of money’ (measured using 
responses to question ‘b’ in figure 1) but renters actually rated this domain as more important than 
owners (results not shown). Another possible explanation, and one deserving of further examination, 
is that housing tenure matters more as an indicator of relative wealth for owners than renters, who 
may signal their wealth through alternative forms of conspicuous consumption (e.g. cars, clothes).                   
 
Even with this caveat, our findings suggest that in the UK, the relative benefits of home-ownership 
are statistically significant and of a meaningful magnitude. These relative benefits could (at least) 
partially explain why, according to some studies, home-owners have higher levels of subjective well-
being and ontological security than renters. They may also explain why demand for home-ownership 
is higher in some countries than others. Furthermore, Rowlands and Gurney (2000) found home-
ownership to be a social norm among children. Seeing as status is a determinant of educational 
outcomes (e.g. Hoff and Pandey, 2004), these relative benefits of home-ownership may even explain 
part of any tenure gap in child educational outcomes (Haurin et al, 2002; Green and White, 1997). If 
researchers do not control or test for these relative benefits when examining the tenure gaps in 
outcomes, they risk attributing their effect to the absolute benefits of home-ownership. We therefore 
echo the call of other researchers (e.g. Manturuk, 2012; Lindblad & Quercia, 2015) to not only 
examine whether home-ownership affects subjective well-being, but also test the pathways through 
which any effect occurs.  
 
These relative benefits provide less justification for the promotion of home-ownership than the oft-
cited absolute benefits, as for every home-owner that benefits from being ‘normal’, other renters pay 
the price for being increasingly ‘abnormal’. Similarly, for every home-buyer that benefits from an 
increase in status, other owners pay the price in the form of lower status. That is not to say that the 
relative benefits of home-ownership are necessarily distributed on a zero sum basis12. The subjective 
well-being that home-owners derive from conforming to the social norm may outweigh the 
psychological costs that renters incur from deviating (although our findings do suggest they offset 
each other). Similarly, the psychological benefits that a home-owner derives from signalling an 
increase in their relative wealth may not be entirely offset by the psychological costs that others incur 
from a decrease in social status.    
 
Even if these relative benefits are distributed on a zero sum basis, it does not mean that the UK, or 
any other country that promotes home-ownership, should become tenure neutral. There are many 
other arguments both for and against home-ownership13. Nevertheless, by providing evidence to 
support the existence of these relative benefits, we cast doubt on the significance those absolute 
benefits of home-ownership, which are often cited to justify state support of home-ownership 
Our findings also imply that in the UK at least, the welfare gap between owners and renters is wider 
than previously thought. Not only do home-owners benefit financially, through state led tax breaks, at 
the expense of renters; they also benefit from having higher status than renters, and from ‘being 
normal’.  
 
The negative sanctions associated with ‘being abnormal’ are particularly acute for social renters. 
Future research should examine the extent and form of these sanctions, and the role that media 
coverage and government rhetoric play in augmenting them. This is an important area of research as 
                                                            
12
 Thanks to Viggo Nordvik for raising this point. 
13
 See Dietz and Haurin (2003) for economists’ review of the evidence; and Shlay (2005) for a more historical and critical 
review. 
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these sanctions may undermine regeneration initiatives, and may also play a role in explaining why 
social housing tenants have higher than predicted levels of unemployment (Hills, 2007).  
 
Finally, there are two broader research questions that arise out of our findings;  
 
1. Who are the ‘relevant others’ and what sanctions do they mobilise to enforce home-
ownership as a social norm?   
 
A notable limitation of our study is that does not shed light on who an individual’s relevant others are. 
We defined relevant others as people of a similar age, education and region but this does not fully 
capture the complexity of an individual’s relevant others. Future (qualitative) research should explore 
whose opinion counts when individuals are deciding which tenure to choose; is it family, friends, 
colleagues, neighbours, or media or some other group? Future (qualitative) research could also 
explore how relevant others’ values and consumption influence individual subjective well-being (or 
housing tenure choices). Are renters openly mocked/ostracised by their home-owning relevant others? 
Or is it subtler, in that past a particular age, renters feel that they are deviating from the social norm of 
ownership? Knight (2002) was the last paper to address these questions in the UK context, but since 
then home-ownership rates have declined, implying that the social norm of home-ownership may 
have weakened, thus more research is needed.  
 
Among relevant others, home-owners have a particular interest in maintaining and enforcing the 
social norm of home-ownership, as they are beneficiaries. If UK home-ownership rates continue to 
decline, it will be in the interests of fewer people to sustain the normalising discourse of home-
ownership. Renters – who cannot access home-ownership- may increasingly challenge the idea that 
home-ownership is ‘normal’. Home-ownership may therefore become less of a social norm14, and the 
relative benefits of home-ownership may diminish, further undermining the appeal of home-
ownership. There could, in short, be a tipping point causing the decline in home-ownership rates to 
accelerate.          
 
That said, any challenge to the idea that home-ownership is ‘normal’ is likely to face considerable 
resistance from other beneficiaries. Developers, the financial services industry, the real estate 
industry, planners, road builders all benefit from high rates of home-ownership (Buchholz, 2002). It is 
therefore in the interest of these parties to portray home-ownership as ‘normal’ through marketing, 
speeches, policy and lobbying or other means. The UK government has also played a significant role 
in normalising home-ownership. Future research should build on the discourse analysis of Gurney 
(1999) to examine the role of these different actors, including home-owners themselves, in portraying 
home-ownership as ‘normal’.  
 
 
2. What are the relative benefits of housing more generally? 
In this paper we have focussed on home-ownership but other housing characteristics are also likely to 
determine an individual’s status. In the UK, the ongoing ‘housing crisis’ is usually defined in terms of 
a lack of supply. However, what if house size is a positional good, as proposed by Frank (2007)? 
What if people not only want enough space to facilitate those activities that enhance their subjective 
well-being, but also want more space than their relevant others? Then we are stuck in what Frank 
(2007) defines as a ‘positional arms race’
15
. In the short term and at the individual level, it is rational 
to purchase a larger house for increased status. But at the collective level it reduces the status of 
everyone else, who feels pressure to buy a larger house too, thereby eliminating the status advantage 
of the original status seeker. Research on the relative vs absolute benefits of income could provide a 
template for future research in this area (e.g. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). 
                                                            
14
 Logic implies that home-ownership will still remain a positional good in this case. 
15 This is essentially the prisoner’s dilemma applied to status seeking.  
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One’s neighbourhood may also be a positional good. Much of the ‘neighbourhood effects’ debate is 
centred on whether there are material benefits (e.g. educational opportunities) associated with living – 
and growing up- in a wealthier neighbourhood. Much less research has examined the relative benefits 
of living in a neighbourhood with high socio-economic status. If, by living in a relatively wealthy 
neighbourhood, one signals they are relatively wealthy, this signal will increase their status. 
Differences in neighbourhood status may partly explain spatial disparities in outcomes such as 
education, health and subjective well-being. Furthermore, as Phe and Wakeley (2000) posited in their 
theoretical model, it may also explain new trends in residential location such as gentrification and 
abandonment.  
Summarising, this paper has demonstrated that i) the subjective well-being of owners and renters 
depends on the home-ownership values of relevant others, thus implying that in the UK, home-
ownership is a social norm, and ii) the subjective well-being of owners is also negatively related to the 
home-ownership rates of relevant others, implying that for owners, home-ownership is also a 
positional good. Together, these findings suggest that home-owners enjoy relative benefits at the 
expense of renters: first, through being considered ‘normal’ by society versus renters who are 
considered ‘abnormal’, and second through being considered wealthier than renters. These relative 
benefits of home-ownership may explain ‘tenure gaps’ subjective well-being, and other outcomes, and 
therefore require further examination.   
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Figure 1 
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Table 1 - Specification one 
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
 OWNERS RENTERS 
VARIABLES Life Sat GHQ caseness Life Sat GHQ caseness 
     
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES 
-0.00365** -0.00336 -0.00034 0.0059 
 -0.00169 -0.00488 -0.00351 -0.00936 
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOMEOWNERSHIP VALUES 
0.141*** 0.368** -0.292** -0.546* 
 -0.053 -0.147 -0.134 -0.323 
POOR_HEALTH -0.456*** -1.663*** -0.605*** -2.354*** 
 -0.0526 -0.15 -0.0862 -0.221 
FREQ_MEETING_PEOPLE -0.0254* 0.0208 -0.0854** -0.101 
 -0.0136 -0.0389 -0.0352 -0.0809 
NEIGHBOUR_NOISE -0.0664* -0.143 -0.0413 -0.192 
 -0.0398 -0.113 -0.0653 -0.158 
DAMP_WALLS -0.102** -0.0835 -0.0767 0.101 
 -0.0456 -0.13 -0.07 -0.171 
CARING_HRS_SPENT -0.0275*** -0.103*** -0.00625 0.00725 
 -0.00764 -0.0212 -0.0146 -0.0365 
HH_PERSONS -0.113*** -0.160*** -0.0527 -0.0373 
 -0.0202 -0.0571 -0.0365 -0.0997 
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
INCOME 
1.83E-06 -2.66e-05* -2.90e-05* -5.82E-05 
 -5.77E-06 -1.60E-05 -1.51E-05 -3.76E-05 
HOUSING_COSTS -0.000129*** -0.000450*** 0.00021 0.000415 
 -4.39E-05 -0.00014 -0.00017 -0.00042 
EMPLOYED 0.0619 0.473*** 0.316*** 0.886*** 
 -0.0423 -0.122 -0.0709 -0.196 
RETIRED 0.151*** 0.576*** 0.308** 0.461* 
 -0.0489 -0.133 -0.121 -0.256 
MARRIED 0.352*** 0.569** 0.276** -0.241 
 -0.0859 -0.273 -0.134 -0.331 
COHABITING 0.350*** 0.540* 0.342*** 0.297 
 -0.081 -0.276 -0.107 -0.262 
WIDOWED -0.114 -0.373 -0.332 -1.665*** 
 -0.115 -0.33 -0.218 -0.488 
DIVORCED 0.0687 0.236 -0.0595 -0.344 
 -0.111 -0.329 -0.175 -0.473 
SEPARATED -0.250* -1.936*** -0.0519 -1.134** 
 -0.145 -0.459 -0.218 -0.552 
LOG_INCOME 0.0178 -0.00875 0.0158 -0.249** 
 -0.022 -0.0568 -0.0407 -0.112 
AGE -0.059 -0.269** -0.0534 -0.174 
 -0.0498 -0.118 -0.0887 -0.143 
AGESQ -0.000175** -0.00108*** -0.00015 -0.000675* 
 -8.44E-05 -0.00022 -0.00018 -0.00039 
HH_KIDS 0.0523** 0.165*** 0.0439 0.0624 
 -0.0204 -0.0571 -0.0453 -0.125 
     
OBSERVATIONS 21,463 21,462 8,976 8,939 
R-SQUARED 0.041 0.052 0.085 0.115 
NUMBER OF PID 11,651 11,636 6,427 6,404 
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Note 2: Dummies for region, year, and region-year interactions were included but are not shown.  
Note 3: Variables for education level, accommodation type and number of rooms were statistically insignificant 
in all four regressions, so are not shown. 
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Figure 2: Regressions showing how the effect of becoming a home-owner on GHQ Caseness (left) and 
Life Satisfaction (right) is moderated by relevant others’ home-ownership values (x axis).  
Note: we do not use ‘at means’ option when predicting margins 
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Table 2 – Testing relationship between home-ownership values of relevant others and values of 
individual 
VARIABLES HOME-OWNERSHIP VALUES 
  
RELEVANT OTHERS’ HOME-
OWNERSHIP VALUES 
0.193** 
 -0.087 
FIXED EFFECTS Yes 
  
OBSERVATIONS 31,467 
NUMBER OF PID 17,509 
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
Note 2: Same variables used as specification one (see table 1) but with individual home-ownership values as 
dependent variable instead of subjective well-being 
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Appendix 1: Results when we drop regional criterion, and instead define relevant others using only 
age and education criteria (i.e. national relevant others) 
 
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
Note 2: Same variables used as specification one (see table 1) but with differently defined relevant others 
 
     
VARIABLES life_sat GHQ_caseness life_sat GHQ_caseness 
     
NATIONAL RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOME-OWNERSHIP RATES 
-0.00335* -0.00278 -3.94E-
05 
0.00558 
 -0.00174 -0.00497 -0.00348 -0.00941 
NATIONAL RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOME-OWNERSHIP VALUES 
0.145*** 0.278* -0.16 -0.479 
 -0.0554 -0.153 -0.141 -0.356 
     
OBSERVATIONS 23,084 22,997 9,637 9,557 
R-SQUARED 0.041 0.052 0.085 0.115 
NUMBER OF PID 12,405 12,353 6,831 6,787 
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Appendix 2: Variable description 
Variable Description 
Variables at relevant others’ level 
Relevant Others’ Home 
Ownership Values 
Home-ownership values among relevant others 
Relevant Others’ Home 
Ownership Rates 
Home-ownership rates among relevant others 
Relevant Others’ Income Mean individual income of relevant others 
Variables at individual level 
High_educ 1=achieved higher qualification (in further educ. institution) 0=otherwise 
(reference group=low_educ) 
Med_educ 1=highest qualification is O-levels, GCSE’s or A-levels; 0=otherwise (reference 
group=low_educ) 
Low educ 1=no o-levels or GCSE’s; 0=otherwise  
log_income Log of household income 
married  1=married; 0=otherwise (reference group=single people) 
cohabiting 1=cohabiting;0=otherwise (reference group=single people) 
widowed 1=widowed;0=otherwise (reference group=single people) 
Separated 1=separated; 0=otherwise (reference group=single people) 
divorced 1=divorced;0=otherwise (reference group=single people) 
Caring_hrs_spent Hours per week spent caring for someone 
Hh_persons Number of people in household  
Hh_kids Number of children in household 
freq_meeting_people Frequency of meeting people 1=most days; 2=once/twice a week; 
3=once/twice a month; 4=<once a month; 5=never 
retired 1= Retired; 0=otherwise  (reference group is unemployed) 
Employed 1=Employed;0=otherwise (reference group is unemployed) 
house 1=Individual lives in house; 0=Individual lives in flat 
number_rooms Number of rooms in household (excl. kitchens, bathrooms, and any rooms let 
or sublet) 
age age at time of interview 
poor_health 1=Health status poor/very poor over last 12 months;0=otherwise  
neighbour_noise 1 = if reports neighbour noise problem; 0 = otherwise  
damp_walls 1 = if, according to respondent, home has damp; 0 = otherwise  
housing_costs Net Monthly Housing Costs  
Year and regional dummy variables 
y1998; y2003 1= Observed in that particular year; 0=otherwise (y2008=reference group) 
Regional dummies 1=Observed in that region; 0=otherwise 
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Appendix 3 – Results when we introduce relevant others house size as a control variable  
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
Note 2: Same variables used as specification one (see table 1) but with addition of relevant others’ rooms per 
person  
 
     
VARIABLES life_sat GHQ_caseness life_sat GHQ_caseness 
     
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES 
-0.00391** -0.00451 -0.00213 0.00468 
 -0.00171 -0.00492 -0.00353 -0.00951 
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOMEOWNERSHIP VALUES 
0.124** 0.290* -0.327** -0.570* 
 -0.0552 -0.151 -0.135 -0.322 
RELEVANT OTHERS ROOMS PER 
PERSON 
0.0808 0.356* 0.499*** 0.344 
 -0.0674 -0.197 -0.17 -0.423 
     
OBSERVATIONS 21,463 21,462 8,976 8,939 
R-SQUARED 0.041 0.052 0.088 0.115 
NUMBER OF PID 11,651 11,636 6,427 6,404 
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Appendix 4 – Splitting renters sample into private renters and social renters 
 PRIVATE RENTERS SOCIAL RENTERS 
VARIABLES life_sat GHQ_caseness life_sat GHQ_caseness 
     
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES 
0.00409 0.0118 -0.00352 0.0134 
 -0.00511 -0.013 -0.00581 -0.0159 
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOMEOWNERSHIP VALUES 
-0.331 -0.0972 -0.302* -0.989** 
 -0.217 -0.614 -0.178 -0.421 
FIXED EFFECTS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
OBSERVATIONS 4214 4207 4762 4732 
NUMBER OF PID 3360 3357 3283 3264 
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01  
Note 2: Same variables used as specification one (see table 1)  
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Appendix 5 – Regressions showing how the effect of becoming a home-owner is moderated by 
relevant others’ home-ownership values        
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
            
    
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
Note 2: Same variables used as specification one (see table 1) with addition of binary own/rent variable and 
interaction term (both shown above). Relevant others’ home-ownership rates included but not shown.  
   
VARIABLES GHQ_caseness life_sat 
   
RELEVANT OTHERS’ HOME-
OWNERSHIP VALUES 
-0.406** -0.182** 
 -0.203 -0.083 
OWN (AS OPPOSED TO RENT) -6.695*** -2.449*** 
 -1.565 -0.62 
OWN # RELEVANT OTHERS’ HOME-
OWNERSHIP VALUES 
0.832*** 0.309*** 
 -0.2 -0.0793 
   
OBSERVATIONS 30,401 30,439 
R-SQUARED 0.057 0.045 
NUMBER OF PID 16,843 16,872 
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Appendix 6 – Regressions excluding movers 
 
VARIABLES LIFE_SAT GHQ_CASENESS LIFE_SAT GHQ_CASENESS 
     
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 
RATES 
-0.00712** -0.0195** 0.000306 0.0123 
 -0.0029 -0.00863 -0.00646 -0.0163 
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 
VALUES 
0.213*** 0.499** -0.217 -0.053 
 -0.0735 -0.2 -0.209 -0.464 
FIXED EFFECTS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
OBSERVATIONS 12,615 12,600 4,263 4,240 
NUMBER OF PID 7,792 7,775 3,269 3,250 
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
Note 2: Same variables used as specification one (see table 1) 
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Appendix 7– Tests for Multi-Collinearity 
 
 OWNERS  RENTERS  
VARIABLES Life Sat GHQ caseness Life Sat GHQ caseness 
     
RELEVANT OTHERS’ HOME 
OWNERSHIP RATES 
-0.00376** -0.00675 -0.00389 -0.00296 
 -0.00163 -0.00472 -0.00326 -0.00847 
RELEVANT OTHERS’ HOME 
OWNERSHIP VALUES 
0.131** 0.414*** -0.229* -0.416 
 -0.052 -0.145 -0.132 -0.314 
FIXED EFFECTS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
OBSERVATIONS 21,669 21,665 9,066 9,028 
NUMBER OF PID 11,823 11,804 6,505 6,481 
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
Note 2: Same variables used as specification one (see table 1) but without age, education, region and 
region*year variables 
 
Page 28 of 29
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
  
Appendix 8 – Testing Cardinality Assumption – Logit Regressions with GHQ Caseness  
 
 POOLED LOGIT FIXED EFFECTS LOGIT 
 Owners Renters Owners Renters 
VARIABLES GHQ_caseness_binary 
     
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOME OWNERSHIP 
RATES 
-0.00279 -0.00162 -0.00038 -0.00231 
 -0.00244 -0.00336 -0.00492 -0.00927 
RELEVANT OTHERS’ 
HOME OWNERSHIP 
VALUES 
0.198** 0.107 0.243 -0.334 
 -0.0788 -0.123 -0.159 -0.325 
FIXED EFFECTS No No Yes Yes 
       
OBSERVATIONS 21,462 8,939 7,501 1,971 
NUMBER OF PID   2,919 744 
Note 1: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01 
Note 2: Same variables used as specification one (see table 1), although for fixed effect logit regressions 
regional dummy variables had to be replaced by dummy variables indicating whether individual resided in 
North UK or South UK  
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